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Abstract
Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction, within the common-
value paradigm, we analyse the asymptotic behaviour of the transaction price as the number
of bidders gets large. We ﬁnd that even though the transaction price is determined by a
(potentially small) fraction of losing drop-out bids, that price converges in probability to
the ex ante unknown, true value. Subsequently, we derive the asymptotic distribution of the
transaction price. Finally, we apply our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates
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11 Motivation and Introduction
Duringthepasthalfcentury, economistshavemadeconsiderableprogressinunderstandingthethe-
oretical structure of equilibrium strategic behaviour under market mechanisms, such as auctions;
see Krishna [2010] for a comprehensive presentation and evaluation of progress.
One analytic device, commonly used to describe bidder motivation at single-object auctions,
is a continuous random variable that represents individual-speciﬁc signals concerning the object’s
true, but unknown, value. This true, but unknown, value will be revealed only after the auction
has ended, when the winner has been determined and the transaction price paid. Regardless of the
winner, however, the value of the object is the same to all.
The conceptual experiment involves each potential bidder’s receiving a draw from a signal
distribution. Conditional on his draw, a bidder is then assumed to act purposefully, using the
information in his signal along with Bayes’ rule to maximize either the expected proﬁt or the
expected utility of proﬁt from winning the auction. Another frequently-made assumption is that
the signal draws of bidders are independent and that the bidders are ex ante symmetric—their
draws coming from the same distribution of signals. This framework is often referred to as the
symmetric common-value paradigm (symmetric CVP).
Under these assumptions, a researcher can then focus on a representative agent’s decision rule
when characterizing equilibrium behaviour. Wilson [1977] invented this framework to illustrate
that the winner’s curse could not obtain, in equilibrium, among rational bidders. He also demon-
strated that, when the number of bidders n is large (tends to inﬁnity), the winning bid at ﬁrst-price,
sealed-bid auctions converges almost surely to the true, but unknown, value of the object. In other
words, the auction format and pricing rule play an important role in aggregating the disparate, indi-
vidual pieces of information held by the bidders. Milgrom [1979] subsequently provided a precise
characterization of the structure the signal distribution must possess in order for this convergence
property to hold; Pesendorfer and Swinkels [1997] have referred to this as full information aggre-
gation.
When several, say k, units of a good are simultaneously for sale, at least two important ques-
2tions arise: speciﬁcally, who will be the winning bidders and what price(s) will those winners pay?
Weber [1983] has described a number of diﬀerent multi-unit auction formats as well as pricing
rules under those formats. For example, Milgrom [1981] developed a natural generalization of the
Wilson [1977] model. In Milgrom’s model, each bidder submits a price and the auctioneer then
aggregates these demands, allocating the units to those bidders with the highest k submitted bids.
The winners then pay a uniform price—speciﬁcally, the highest rejected bid.
Pesendorfer and Swinkels [1997] have built on this research by investigating a sequence of
auctions {Ar} in which both nr and kr increase. They demonstrated that a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for full information aggregation is that kr → ∞ and (nr − kr) → ∞, a condition they
referred to as double largeness. Under this condition, non-negligible supply can be a substitute for
the strong signal structure required in Wilson [1977] as well as Milgrom [1979, 1981]. Kremer
[2002] has investigated this further.
Whileitishearteningtoknowthereareconditionsunderwhichtransactionpriceswillconverge
in probability to the true, but unknown, values of objects for sale, the rate at which these prices
converge is also of interest. In particular, Hong and Shum [2004] asked the question “How large
must n be to be large enough?” and then investigated the rates of information aggregation in
common-valueenvironments. Knowingtheconditionsunderwhichthetransactionpriceprovidesa
potentially useful estimate of the object’s unknown value is important to understanding the process
some refer to as price discovery because, in practice, neither the number of bidders nor the number
of units for sale at an auction ever really gets to inﬁnity.
Of course, the pricing rule investigated in Wilson [1977] and Milgrom [1979, 1981] as well
as Pesendorfer and Swinkels [1997, 2000] is not the only pricing rule that could be used under a
sealed-bid format. For example, another pricing rule would involve allocating the k units to those
bidders who tendered the highest k bids, but each winner would then pay what he bid for the unit(s)
he won. In general, at multi-unit auctions, diﬀerent auction formats and diﬀerent pricing rules in-
duce diﬀerent equilibrium behaviour and, thus, translate into diﬀerent transaction prices as well
as potentially diﬀerent expected revenues for sellers. Hence, as Jackson and Kremer [2004, 2006]
3haveemphasized, understandingtheeﬀectsofauctionformatsandpricingruleshasimportantprac-
ticalrelevance. Evensmallchangescanhaveeﬀects, ashasbeenillustratedbyMezzetti and Tsetlin
[2008, 2009].
In a companion paper to Milgrom and Weber [1982], which was published nearly two decades
later, Milgrom and Weber[2000]proposedaninterestingpricingruleformulti-unit, oral, ascending-
price auctions. The model considered by Milgrom and Weber is the multi-unit variant of the clock
model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982] in order to investigate behaviour at single-object,
oral, ascending-price (often referred to as English) auctions. In the multi-unit model, bidders are
assumed to demand at most one unit of the good for sale; Milgrom [2004] has referred to this as
singleton demand. The current price for all units on sale rises continuously according to some
device, such as a clock. As the price rises, the drop-out prices of losing participants are recorded
when they exit the auction. The transaction price is the drop-out price of the last participant to exit
the auction. Each of the remaining k participants is then allocated one unit at the transaction price.
One attractive feature of oral, ascending-price auctions vis-` a-vis sealed-bid ones, regardless
of the pricing rule, is the scope for information release at oral, ascending-price auctions. This is
particularly important in informational environments with substantial common-value components.
In such environments, by observing the actions of his competitors, a bidder can augment the in-
formation contained in his signal and, thus, may be able to reduce the uncertainty concerning the
unknown value of the object for sale. Other things being equal, this reduction in uncertainty can
induce participants to bid more aggressively than under sealed-bid formats, which means the rev-
enues the seller can expect to garner can increase. The greater is the linkage between a bidder’s
information and what he perceives others will bid, the higher the bidding; Milgrom and Weber
[1982] have referred to this as the linkage principle. In models of single-object auctions, they used
it to rank the revenues a seller can expect to garner under the diﬀerent auction formats and pricing
rules. Speciﬁcally, in a theoretical model with one object for sale as well as risk-neutral potential
buyers who have aﬃliated signals from the same marginal distribution, Milgrom and Weber [1982]
demonstrated that the English auction format yields, on average, more revenue than ﬁrst-price auc-
4tions, such as the oral, descending-price (Dutch) format or the ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid format. One
can deduce from the structure of the proof in Milgrom and Weber [1982] that the same linkage
principle applies to the generalized Milgrom–Weber auction we study below.
Our paper is in six additional sections. In the next, we use the Milgrom–Weber clock model to
developatheoreticalframeworkwithinwhichtoinvestigatethestochasticbehaviourofthetransac-
tion price at a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction within the common-value paradigm, while
in section 3, we demonstrate that the transaction price converges in probability to the ex ante un-
known, truevalueasthenumberofbiddersnandthenumberofunitsk getlargeinthePesendorfer–
Swinkels sense. In section 4, we characterize the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price
when both the number of bidders and the number of units get large. We also demonstrate that the
asymptotic variance of the transaction price under the Milgrom–Weber pricing rule is less than
that under the pricing rule used by Pesendorfer and Swinkels. Thus, if the transaction prices un-
der diﬀerent auction formats and pricing rules are viewed as statistical estimators of the true, but
unknown, value of the units for sale, then the Milgrom–Weber rule is a more eﬃcient estimator of
the unknown value than the ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid rule because more information is released under
the Milgrom–Weber rule than under sealed-bid ones. Note, however, that in our model, when the
number of bidders is large, no diﬀerence exists between the average transaction prices under the
two auction formats and pricing rules because they converge to the true value. Moreover, aﬃliation
in signals can only reduce the variance of the transaction price under the Milgrom–Weber pricing
rule. Thus, by working within the symmetric CVP, we provide an upper bound concerning the im-
provement in variance reduction that can obtain under the Milgrom–Weber pricing rule. In section
5, we derive the likelihood function of observed drop-out prices, while in section 6, we apply our
methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China; our empirical work
provides an estimate of the upper bound concerning the decrease in the variances of transaction
prices when using the Milgrom–Weber pricing rule. In the ﬁnal section, we summarize and con-
clude. Any details too cumbersome to be included in the text of the paper have been collected in
the appendix at the end of the paper.
52 Theoretical Model
Consider an oral, ascending-price auction at which k units are for sale to a total of n bidders, each
of whom wants at most one unit. Focus on the Milgrom and Weber [2000] pricing rule described
in the introduction. Assume that each bidder draws an independently- and identically-distributed
signal X, conditional on the true, but unknown, value v0. Denote the cumulative distribution and
probability density functions of X, conditional on v, by FX|V(x|v) and fX|V(x|v), respectively. Denote
by fV(v) the prior distribution of V, the unknown value.
Consider the vector of signals (X1,X2,...,Xn), a random sample of n draws from FX|V(x|v0).
Becausethisenvironmentissymmetric, withoutlossofgenerality, focusbelowonbidder1. Denote
by Yi the ith ordered signal of the opponents of bidder 1, so
Y1 ≥ Y2 ≥     ≥ Yn−1.
Denote by Zi the ith order statistic for all of the Xis, so
Z1 ≥ Z2 ≥     ≥ Zn.
The auction proceeds in rounds m = n,n − 1,...,k + 1. In round m, m bidders continue to
participate in the auction. The auction ends in round (k + 1) when the (k + 1)st bidder exits the
auction. With no loss of generality, suppose that bidders are ordered in the reverse order of exit
from the auction.
Let Ωm denote the information that has already been revealed in round m by all the bidders who
have already left the auction. Hence, Ωm equals {zn,zn−1,...,zm+1}, where Ωn is the empty set ∅.
According to Milgrom and Weber [2000], the symmetric equilibrium bidding rule in round m can
be written as
βm(x) = E[V|X1 = Yk =     = Ym−1 = x,Ωm] (1)
where E denotes the expectation operator. Here, Yk,...,Ym−1 denote the kth through (m−1)st order
6statistics among the bidders who remain competing with bidder 1. On the other hand, the order
statistics in the event Ωm denote the order statistics for all the bidders who have exitted the auction.
For completeness, we describe below our reasoning behind a characterization of the equilibrium;
in their paper, Milgrom and Weber [2000] presumably omitted an argument like this because they
found it obvious.
At price p, bidder 1 is concerned with the event that Yk,...,Ym−1 all drop-out simultaneously at
β−1
m (p), where β−1
m (p) is the inverse bid function. In this event, bidder 1 will be one of the winners
of the auction, together with his remaining (k−1) competitors. Bidder 1 should stay in the auction









In equilibrium, p = βm(x), so x = β−1
m (p)—the price level at which bidder 1 should exit—should









Hence, the functional form of the bid function.
The winning price corresponds to the bid submitted by the bidder with the (k+1)st order statistic
of the signals during round (k + 1). Hence,
ˆ p = E[V|Zk = Zk+1 = zk+1,Ωk+1]. (3)
3 Limiting Information in the Transaction Price
In this section, and the next, we have two goals: ﬁrst, to study the convergence rate of the trans-
action price ˆ p to the unknown true common value v0; and, second, to characterize the limiting
distribution of the transaction price ˆ p. In both of these endeavours, we assume that n gets large,
7tends to inﬁnity.
In this regard, we make the following assumption concerning k, the number of units for sale
relative to n, the number of bidders at the auction.
Assumption 1 [(n − k)/n] → τ, where τ is strictly between 0 and 1.
In words, the proportion of demand met has a stable limit as the numbers of bidders gets large.
Were this not the case, then the transaction price would not have a stable limit, without some po-
tentiallyunrealisticassumptionsconcerning fV(v), aswaspointedoutbyPesendorfer and Swinkels
[1997].
With regard to our goals, we proceed in two steps. In the ﬁrst, we deﬁne ˆ v, the maximum-
likelihood estimator (MLE) of v0, based on the unobserved (to the researcher, but known to the
participants) order statistics zk+1,...,zn, and then we investigate the rate at which ˆ v converges to v0.
In the second, we investigate the rate at which ˆ p converges to ˆ v. In the next section, we demonstrate
formally that the rate of convergence of the price ˆ p to the true common value v0 will be driven
(dominated) by the convergence rate of ˆ v to v0. In other words, (ˆ p−v0) is op
 
ˆ v − v0 
. Therefore, to
understand the rate of information aggregation, it suﬃces to focus on how ˆ v approaches v0 as the
“sample size” n gets large.
Under our assumptions, the MLE ˆ v is deﬁned as


















 k captures the fact that only limited information is known concern-





8captures the fact that there are many ways in which the k highest order statistics of signals could
exceed zk+1. Equation (4) is the joint likelihood of the lowest (n − k) order statistics—those from
zk+1 to zn.
3.1 Convergence of Price to the True Value
Givenequation(4), theaveragelog-likelihoodwillbeafunctionofthelowest(n−k)orderstatistics.
A general function of order statistics can be diﬃcult to analyse because of the potentially complex
correlation structure among order statistics. One possibility is to appeal to the theory of L-statistics
to investigate the convergence properties of functions of order statistics. Fortunately, this particular
average log-likelihood function is more tractable than an L-statistic because it can be rewritten as
a function of the entire sample and the sample τth quantile. Speciﬁcally,


























where ˆ Fn ( ) denotes the empirical distribution function






Now, under the assumptions made formal below, the sample percentile ˆ F−1
n (τ) converges in prob-




, by a uniform law of large numbers, so ˆ Qn (v)
converges uniformly in the parameter space of v to a deterministic function
Q


















In order for information to aggregate fully, Q0 (v), as a function of v, must be uniquely maxi-
9mized at v equal v0. As in the case of full-sample likelihood function, this can be veriﬁed using
Jensen’s inequality. Thus, for any v not equal to v0, Q0 (v) ≤ Q0  
v0 
. This can be shown by taking
the sum of the following two inequalities. First, by Jensen’s inequality,
  F−1
X|V(τ|v0)
−∞ fX|V(x|v0)log fX|V(x|v) dx −
  F−1
X|V(τ|v0)






−∞ fX|V(x|v) dx − logτ
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≤ (1 − τ)log(1 − τ) + τlogτ








, is maximized at τ.
Assumption 2 For v , v0, either F−1













This assumption mirrors a standard full-sample identiﬁcation condition for likelihood analysis.
While the monotone likelihood-ratio condition used by Milgrom and Weber [1982] is required to
derive the equilibrium bidding strategy, conditional on the form of the equilibrium bidding strategy,
it is not strictly necessary for full information aggregation to hold.
The ﬁrst inequality will be strict under the ﬁrst condition in Assumption 2. Likewise for the
second inequality under the second condition in Assumption 2. Thus, we have demonstrated that
Q0 (v) is globally and uniquely maximized at v0 provided the value v identiﬁes the signal distribu-
tion fX|V (x|v) in the sense of Assumption 2, which is stronger than the usual full-sample identiﬁca-
tion condition whenever τ < 1. The usual Jensen’s inequality argument for full-sample likelihood
function is just a special case of the above when τ is one.
10Now, examine the following ﬁrst-order condition at v0:
∂Q0(v)
∂v
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Therefore, subject to the regularity conditions, which are outlined completely in the next section,
ˆ v is a consistent estimator of v0. To wit, (ˆ v − v0)
p
→ 0.
Given that Q0 (v) is a properly-deﬁned averaged log-likelihood function that depends linearly
on the observed sample up to a given sample quantile and that the central sample quantiles are
√
n-consistent as well as distributed asymptotically normal, the information equality then holds for
v, and is related to the asymptotic variance of ˆ v. Given the form of Q0 (v), the expected Hessian is
∂2
∂v2Q0(v)

















































In full-sample likelihood models, the asymptotic variance of the maximum-likelihood estimator
is usually calculated using an information-matrix equality. Here, we show that an analogous
information-matrix equality also holds for the partial sample information model that we consider,
which we shall use to characterize the amount of limiting information contained in the price as an
estimate of the true value.
One approach to calculating the information matrix equality is to view the limiting ﬁrst-order

















           
v=v0
= 0.
This can be written as
∂2
∂v2Q











           
u=v=v0
= 0. (6)
In the next section, the second term on the left-hand side, which is the negative of the Hessian
given in equation (5), will be shown to equal the asymptotic variance of the score function. The
following provides a direct calculation of the second term in equation (6), which independently
veriﬁes equation (6) and facilitates the comparison with the variance of the score function in the
next section.






















































































































dx           
v=v0
.
The next section formally demonstrates that the log-likelihood function of the partially observed





ˆ v − v0 
will converge in distribution to a normal random variable whose asymptotic










           
v=v0
. We now need to
show that
√




ˆ p − v0 
.
For this purpose, we employ Bayesian asymptotic analysis. First, note that
ˆ p = βk+1 (zk+1) =
 
v
fZ|V(Zk = Zk+1 = zk+1,Ωk+1|v)fV(v)
 
fZ|V(Zk = Zk+1 = zk+1,Ωk+1|u)fV(u) du
dv
where the likelihood of the conditioning event in the bid function is proportional to




2fX|V(zk+2|v)    fX|V(zn|v). (7)
Recall the deﬁnition in equation (4)
fV|Z(Zk = Zk+1 = zk+1,Ωk+1|v) = Ln(zk+1,...,zn|v)
fX|V(zk+1|v)
[1 − FX|V(zk+1|v)]




13which we can write, using a change of variables,
√
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model investigated by Milgrom and Weber [1982] is a special case of this result—when τ is one,
which corresponds to the conventional full-sample maximum-likelihood analysis and Bayesian
posterior distribution. At a typical English auction, where τ is one, the only diﬀerence from full-
sample maximum-likelihood analysis is that the maximum order statistic is unobserved. However,
a single order statistic is asymptotically negligible. Likewise, the conditioning event in the bid
function in equation (7) diﬀers from the corresponding partial-sample likelihood in equation (4)
only by a single order statistic and the diﬀerence is asymptotically negligible.
3.3 Simple Example
Consider the following example, which can be solved in closed-form. Suppose that the conditional




exp(−x/v) for x ≥ 0, v > 0.





































      

       fV(v)
14Suppose fV (v) is a diﬀuse prior.1 In this case, the above posterior distribution is then an inverse
gamma distribution having parameters (n − k + 1) and
  m+1
j=n zj + mz
 
, which has mean
E[V|X1 = Yk =     = Ym−1 = z,Ωm] =
 m+1
j=n zj + mz
n − k
,
which is also the bid function at round m. Therefore, the transaction price is given by the bid
function with m equal (k + 1) and z equal zk+1:
ˆ p =
 k+2
j=n zj + (k + 1)zk+1
n − k
.
To see why ˆ p converges to the true v0, note that in this example, Zk+1
p
→ F−1
X|V (τ) which equals




















log(1 − τ)(1 − τ) + τ
  
− v





The maximum-likelihood estimator ˆ v, which is the mode of the posterior distribution, is
ˆ v =
 k+2
j=n zj + (k + 1)zk+1





n − k + 2
ˆ p.
It can then be veriﬁed that
√
n(ˆ p − ˆ v)
p
→ 0.
1We could also use a Pareto prior, but this would clutter the calculations considerably.
154 Asymptotic Distribution of Transaction Price
In this section, we provide formal conditions to justify the claims made in the previous section. Our




ˆ v − v0 
,
while in the second we show that
√
n(ˆ p − ˆ v) is op (1). As Newey and McFadden [1994] as well as
Chernozhukov and Hong [2003] have pointed out, both parts depend on the stochastic equiconti-
nuity properties of the sample-averaged log-likelihood function ˆ Qn (v).
Tobegin, westateassumptionssuﬃcienttothetask. Insteadofstrivingfortheweakestpossible
set of assumptions, we are content with potentially overly-strong suﬃcient conditions that illustrate
the main results. Note, too, that in theoretical models of auctions, the monotone likelihood-ratio
condition is typically imposed, which restricts how weak the conditions for equicontinuity can be.
Assumption 3 The support of the prior distribution fV (v) is a compact closed interval, and the
true common value v0 is contained in the interior of that interval.
Assumption 4 The support of fX|V (x|v) is independent of v and bounded, while log fX|V (x|v) is
uniformly bounded, having bounded continuous third derivatives in both arguments on its support.
These two assumptions are regularity conditions required to demonstrate uniform convergence
and stochastic equicontinuity.
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ˆ p − v
0  d
−→ N [0,Σ(τ)].
16Remark 1: In the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model, under the same assumption (k/n) → (1−τ), only
the signal of a single last-losing bidder is revealed, instead of the signals of all the losing bidders.
Therefore, intuitively, the transaction price in the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model should aggregate
less information than that in the Milgrom–Weber model. In fact, this turns out to be true. While
the prices in both the Pesendorfer–Swinkels and the Milgrom–Weber models converge to v0 at
rate
√
n, the asymptotic variance of the Pesendorfer–Swinkels price is greater than the Milgrom–
Weber price. We demonstrate this result formally using the inﬂuence function representation of the




where the inﬂuence function ψ1 (X,τ) is given by









































Next, we characterize the average log-likelihood function as well as the score and inﬂuence func-
tions in the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model, and show that they imply a variance larger than Σ(τ).
Theaveragelog-likelihoodofthePesendorfer–Swinkelsmodel, whichdependsonlyonasingle
order statistic zk+1 = ˆ F−1
n (τ), is given by
˜ Qn (v) = k
n log
 





















Its corresponding score function is
∂
∂v















If we evaluate the ﬁrst-order approximation of the score function with respect to ˆ F−1





at v = v0, and make use of the well-established asymptotic approximation






























τ|v0   + op (1), (8)









































































































We can then easily verify that
Cov
 













Remark 2: Above, we have indexed the asymptotic variance by τ, the proportion of losing bidders.
Intuitively, the larger the fraction of losing bidders, the more information revealed at the auction.
Therefore, we expect Σ(τ) to be a monotonically decreasing function of τ, in a matrix sense. In
other words, for any 0 < τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ 1,
Σ(τ1) ≥ Σ(τ2).












ψ1 (X,τ1) − ψ1 (X,τ2),ψ1 (X,τ1)
 
= 0. (9)















































Hence, under the assumptions made above, especially the common support Assumption 4, for
0 < τ ≤ 1, the larger is τ, the more information is aggregated in the Milgrom–Weber model, in
the sense of having a smaller variance despite that the rate of convergence stays the same. It can
also be shown that this conclusion continues to hold without the support Assumption 4. When
19the upper support is increasing in v, while the condition still holds, the rate of convergence can
improve beyond
√
n when τ equals one. On the other hand, if the lower support is also increasing
in v, then it is possible that the convergence rate is faster than
√
n even when τ is zero. In this case,
while there will be no information loss when τ increases above zero, there may be no additional
asymptotic information either until τ becomes one.
This desirable monotonicity property of information aggregation in the Milgrom–Weber model
is in contrast to the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model. The amount of information aggregated asymp-




is uniform in X, the worst τ for information aggregation is one-half in the Pesendorfer–
Swinkels model, because this involves the worst balance between the winner’s curse and the loser’s
curse. Ingeneral, theoptimalτinthePesendorfer–Swinkelsmodelobviouslydependsontheshape
of this conditional density. Intuitively, in the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model, a diﬀerent τ selects a
diﬀerent information set, while in the Milgrom–Weber model, a larger τ always selects a larger
information set.
5 Deriving Likelihood Function of Observed Drop-Out Prices
In section 2, we derived the bid function of a representative bidder as well as characterized the
transaction price; see equations (1) and (3). In sections 3 and 4, we then demonstrated that the
transaction price converged in probability to the true, unknown value v0 and derived its asymptotic
distribution. To provide a framework within which to conduct our empirical analysis in section 6,
in this section, we derive the likelihood function of the bid data observed by an econometrician.
We highlight the fact that the sampling variability of the econometrician’s estimate of the true, but
unknown value v0 will depend on nuisance parameters unknown to the econometrician.
We ﬁrst introduce some additional notation. We denote by ˆ pj the jth drop-out price, so j =
1,2,...,n − k. For example, in our empirical application, we have n equal forty bidders and k
equal twenty units, so there are twenty drop-out prices, the last being the transaction price, which
20wedenotedaboveby ˆ p, butnowdenoteas ˆ pn−k. Thus, ourobservablesare(ˆ p1, ˆ p2,..., ˆ pn−k−1, ˆ pn−k).
Now, fromequation(2), wecanrecoverthesignalconsistentwiththeﬁrstbidder’sdrop-outprice—
viz.,
˜ zn = β
−1
n (ˆ p1).
Likewise, for each of j = 2,3,...,n−k, we can recursively recover ˜ zj, the signals of the (n−k−1)
losing bidders, so
˜ zn−j+1 = β
−1
n−j+1(ˆ pj;Ωn−j+1).
For the k bidders who win the auction, all we know is that Zj exceeds β−1
n−(n−k−1)(ˆ pn−k;Ωk+1).
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If we assume that fV(v) is diﬀuse and that X given v is normal, having mean v and variance σ2,
then we can write
g(X1 = Yk = ... = Ym−1 = x,Ωm|v) =
 
1 − Φ
 x − v
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Consider (˜ zn, ˜ zn−1,..., ˜ zk+1), the vector of (n − k) signals consistent with the observed drop-out
21prices as well as the transaction price. The joint likelihood function of all the signals consistent
with the drop-out prices revealed under the Milgrom–Weber auction is
˜ Ln(˜ zk+1,..., ˜ zn|v,θ) =
 
1 − FX|V(˜ zk+1|v,θ)
 k fX|V(˜ zk+1|v,θ)




           
fX|V(˜ zk+2|v,θ)




               fX|V(˜ zn|v,θ)




           
(10)
Here, θ denotes a vector of unknown parameters, and captures the fact the probability density and
cumulative distribution functions of signals can depend on parameters known to the bidders, but
unknown to the econometrician.
The econometrician’s MLE ˜ v is deﬁned as







˜ Ln(˜ zk+1,..., ˜ zn|v, ˜ θ)
 
where ˜ θ denotes the MLE of θ
0. While knowing the true nuisance parameters in θ
0 is unimportant
in demonstrating that the transaction price converges in probability to the true, unknown value v0,
becausetheparameterscontainedinθ
0 areofsecond-orderimportance, thenuisanceparametersare
critical when calculating an estimate of the sampling variation in ˜ v, the econometrician’s estimate
of the true, but unknown value v0.
6 Empirical Application
We have applied the methods described above to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in
Shenzhen, China in October 2007. At this auction, the municipal transportation bureau sold 2,000
additional red taxi license plates. Red taxis are special in Shenzhen because they can operate both
inside and outside the Special Economic Zone (SEZ), unlike yellow taxis which can operate only
inside the SEZ, and green taxis which can only operate outside the SEZ.
The city of Shenzhen had not issued any new license plates for red taxis since 1993. However,
rapid growth in Shenzhen’s population meant that patrons were experiencing a shortage of taxis,
22leading to an increase in the number of illegally-operated taxis. In 2007, the per capita number
of taxis in Shenzhen was low when compared to other parts of China: only 10,305 taxis were
licensed in a city of 7.5 million permanent residents, about 13.74 taxis for every 10,000 residents.
The Ministry of Construction in China recommended that cities should have 21 taxis for every
10,000 residents.
Before the auction, the authorities reviewed the qualiﬁcations of all those who had applied to
participate at the auction. Potential bidders could be individual taxi companies or groups formed
by diﬀerent companies. While ﬁfty-one ‘ﬁrms’ apparently requested to participate, only forty
potential bidders were certiﬁed to participate at the auction. Thus, n was 40.
In written documentation, potential bidders were reminded to be aware of the risks involved.
For example, consider a translation of the text from one document:
Following this auction, more taxi license plates will be issued through auction or other
ways over the next four years. The number of taxis in Shenzhen will reach about
20,000 by 2011. The issuance of a great number of license plates might have much
impact on the taxi industry.
Despite these warnings, representatives of taxi companies in the city showed great interest in the
auction, perhaps because operating a taxi has been one of the highest proﬁt margins in the trans-
portation industry. Also, historically, taxis have provided a stable return against investment.
Before the auction, 53 out of 73 taxi companies in Shenzhen owned between 50 to 200 taxis
each. To wit, the majority of the city’s taxi companies were small- and medium-sized ones. Some
incumbent taxi drivers expressed concern that entry would erode proﬁts. One was quoted in the
local newpaper (our translation) as saying that
Actually we are not earning much nowadays. If more taxis were on the road, we would
have a hard time making ends meet.
In contrast, local residents supported the issuance of additional license plates. One was quoted
(again our translation from the local newspaper) as saying
23The sooner new taxis hit the road the better. It’s too hard to hail a taxi during peak
hours and holidays.
This anecdotal evidence, along with casual observation, suggests to us that the value of a red-
taxi license plate in Shenzhen has a large common-value component. Before the auction, however,
this common value was unknown to potential bidders. Using whatever means at their disposal,
potential bidders formed estimates of the unknown common value which they then used during
bidding at the auction.
The auction in Shenzhen proceeded according to the rules described in Milgrom and Weber
[2000]. In written rules announced before the auction, the authorities informed potential bidders
that the 2,000 license plates on sale would be distributed evenly among the ﬁnal twenty highest
bidders; each winner would be required to buy 100 license plates.
The auctioneer, Tian Tao, was a registered member of China’s auction industry association.
The reserve price was set at 150,000 yuan per license plate, but the price rose to 500,000 yuan
in fourth minute of bidding. During the auction, Tian reminded bidders repeatedly to be aware
of the risks involved. In fact, Tao took a break for ten minutes to allow the bidders “to cool their
enthusiasm.” We have translated one of his comments as “this is one of the most intensive auctions
I’ve experienced in my career as an auctioneer.” At the close of the auction, the price of a red-taxi
license plate was 542,500 yuan, around US$80,000.
In table 1, we present the prices called out during the auction along with the number of bidders
who exited the auction at those prices, while in ﬁgure 1 we depict the empirical survivor function
of prices. The prices in this table are in 10,000 yuan.
Zhang Hongzhi, a manager of Shenzhen Xilie Taxi Company, was reported in the newspaper
to have said that he “felt very excited after we won a bid.” Before his attending the auction, his
company had decided on 550,000 yuan as the highest they would pay for a red-taxi license plate.
To implement equation (4), we assumed that X, conditional on v0, is distributed normally,



































Figure 1: Estimated Survivor Function of Drop-Out Prices
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We also assumed that fV(v) is a diﬀuse prior. In table 2, we present the MLEs of v0 and σ as well
as their standard errors; the logarithm of the likelihood function for this empirical speciﬁcation is
−55.98. Here, the units of the parameters estimates are in 10,000 yuan.
In order to understand the implications of these parameter estimates, we used these parameters
to simulate the diﬀerences between the prices in a Milgrom–Weber auction and a Pesendorfer–
Swinkels auction. A subset of these results are reported in table 3. Each entry in the table provides
the diﬀerence in the expected revenue between the Milgrom–Weber auction and the Pesendorfer–
Swinkels auction, measured in units of 10,000 yuan. In calculating table 3, we need three param-
25eters: the prior mean and variance of the common value distribution as well as the variance of
the signal distribution conditional on the common value. We used the estimate of v0 to specify
the prior mean, and the estimate of σ necessary to specify both the variance of the signal dis-
tribution and the prior variance of the value distribution. As predicted by the linkage principle
of Milgrom and Weber [1982], the Milgrom–Weber auction always generates an higher expected
revenue than the Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction. However, as table 3 illustrates, the diﬀerence in
the expected revenues is rather small when compared to both the selling price and the estimated
common value.
7 Summary and Conclusions
Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price, auction, within the common-value
paradigm, under the Milgrom–Weber pricing rule, we have analysed the asymptotic behaviour of
the transaction price as the number of bidders and the number of units get large. We have demon-
strated that even though the transaction price is determined by a (potentially small) fraction of
losing drop-out bids, that price converges almost surely to the ex ante unknown, true value. Subse-
quently, we have demonstrated that the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price is Gaussian.
We also demonstrated that the asymptotic variance of the transaction price under the Milgrom–
Weber pricing rule is less than that under the pricing rule used by Pesendorfer and Swinkels. Thus,
if the transaction prices under diﬀerent auction formats and pricing rules are viewed as statistical
estimators of the true, but unknown, value of the units for sale, then the Milgrom–Weber pricing
rule is a more eﬃcient estimator of the unknown value than the ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid rule because
more information is released under the Milgrom–Weber rule than under sealed-bid ones. Note,
however, that in our model, when the number of bidders is large, no diﬀerence exists between the
average transaction prices under the two auction formats and pricing rules because they converge
to the true value. Moreover, aﬃliation in signals can only reduce the variance of the transaction
price under the Milgrom–Weber pricing rule. Thus, by working within the symmetric CVP, we
26have provided an upper bound concerning the improvement in variance reduction that obtains un-
der the Milgrom–Weber pricing rule. Finally, we applied our methods to data from an auction of
taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China, ﬁnding that our estimate of the unknown, true value
was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the transaction price at size 0.01, but is at size 0.05.
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Appendix
To reduce clutter in the text of the paper, in this appendix, we collect the proofs of the results
claimed in the text.
Proof of Main Theorem
The proof involves verifying two high-level conditions in Newey and McFadden [1994] as well
as Chernozhukov and Hong [2003]. The ﬁrst condition delivers consistency, while the second
delivers asymptotic normality of ˆ v and the relation that
√
n(ˆ p − ˆ v) is op (1). We ﬁrst state these
27conditions within the context of our notation.
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, where both J0 and Ω0 are positive deﬁnite.
Condition 1 is, in turn, implied by uniform convergence of ˆ Qn (v) to Q0 (v) and because Q0 (v)
is uniquely maximized at v0. The unique maximum of Q0 (v) at v0 is a direct consequence of
the identiﬁcation Assumption 2. To show that supv∈V | ˆ Qn (v) − Q0 (v)| is op (1), ﬁrst note that the
individual terms in the summand of the second term consist of the product of log fX|V (Xi|v) and
1(Xi ≤ ξ), where ξ equals ˆ F−1
n (τ). Given Assumption 4, the ﬁrst is a type II function and the
second is a type I function deﬁned in Andrews [1994]. Both satisfy Pollard’s entropy condition,
and are stable under multiplication. Hence,
sup
v,ξ
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, we also have
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0             = op (1).
28Therefore, the second term of ˆ Qn (v) converges uniformly in v to the second term of Q0 (v). The
ﬁrst term of ˆ Qn (v) is also a Lipschitz function of ˆ F−1
n (τ) with the Lipschitz constant being uniform
in v. Therefore, by the same argument, the ﬁrst term of ˆ Qn (v) also converges uniformly in v to the
ﬁrst term of Q0 (v). Hence, Condition 1 holds.
The second condition is more involved than the ﬁrst. We deﬁne ˆ ξ to be ˆ F−1














is diﬀerentiable in v, it is not in ˆ ξ, so arguments relying on stochastic continuity arguments
are required. The ∆n
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respectively. We decompose Rn (v) into R1
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1 + n|v − v0|2 ≤
|R2
n (v)|
n|v − v0|2 = op(1).
29Consider, next, R1
n (v), and deﬁne ˆ m(v,ξ) = ∂
∂v ˆ Qn (v,ξ). By stochastic equicontinuity, it follows
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1 + n|v − v0|2 = op (1).
Having veriﬁed Conditions 2.i and 2.ii, it remains to verify Condition 2.iii. The Hessian term J0
is obviously positive deﬁnite because the limiting likelihood function is multiple-times smoothly
diﬀerentiable, and because v0 uniquely maximizes Q0  
v0,ξ0 



































































30where ˆ E denotestheempiricalmean. Becausewehaverepresentedtheinﬂuencefunctionof(ˆ ξ−ξ0)





















































































Direct calculation of the asymptotic variance in the last line, while accounting for the covariance






























By inspection, we see that its inverse coincides with the asymptotic variance given in Σ(τ),
which has been veriﬁed to equal J0 in the information matrix equality calculation and, hence, is









ˆ v − v0 
.
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Exits 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Total Exits 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Price 53.90 53.95 54.00 54.05 54.10 54.15 54.20 54.25
Exits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total Exits 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20




34Table 3: Simulated Diﬀerences in Expected Revenue
Number of Objects
Number of Bidders 10 20 30
20 0.138
30 0.301 0.079
40 0.265 0.127 0.171
35